LITTLE ROCK — The state-of-the-art in terrorist explosive isn’t the bomb hidden in a shoe. It’s not peroxide-based liquid explosives spirited onboard aircraft in containers of 3 fluid ounces. And it’s not undershorts with a special packet of plastic explosive designed by al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.
Last year, one of the most wanted figures in Yemen turned himself in to Saudi authorities and requested to meet Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, head of Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism operations. The known terrorist went through Saudi security screenings at airports. He passed through metal detectors. He underwent a search by the prince’s own security detail.
Yet he was still able to get close enough to Nayef to set off an explosive device hidden-to put this delicately-in a body cavity. The prince survived, sustaining only minor injuries. The terrorist was not as fortunate.
The phenomenon of terrorists improvising on the work of drug smugglers and using parts of their bodies as munitions dumps should come as no surprise. The fact that al-Qaida has not yet followed up on the underwear bombing attempt using this method is surprising. It may only be a matter of time.
If so, then what? When box cutters became a threat, we gave up our nail clippers. When shoes became a threat, we submitted our footwear for inspection. Now undergarments pose a threat, and we face advanced imaging and enhanced pat-downs. If body cavities become a threat, will we be required to submit to MRIs and manual probing before boarding an aircraft?
People are upset that TSA agents are peering through their clothes or feeling up grandma. Butthey are especially upset at the prospect that these intrusions may not be providing much in the way of additional security because the next terrorist improvisation will render them meaningless.
Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has been in a reactive mode with regard to security in the air. A tragedy or near tragedy occurs, and like the generals fighting the last war, the government lays out new measures to fight the old threat. Al-Qaida, though, has yet to use the same method twice in attempting to hijack or blow up an airliner.
As a strategy, it’s absurd, allowing al-Qaida to fashion new kinds of bombs for a few hundred dollars that will provoke spasms of security responses costing airlines and taxpayers billions. For the government, it seemingly presents a no-win situation. Respond, and stand accused of wasting money on intrusive measures. Do nothing, and bear the blame when the next terrorist attack succeeds.
There’s a better way. Instead of only looking for weapons and bombs, our security screening process should also be looking for the people who are likely to carry them. That means profiling-a no-no for some of the same people now complaining about virtual strip searches. Not racial or religious profiling. Criminal, behavioral profiling.
Israel has more to fear from terrorism than any nation. But travelers who go through Ben Gurion International Airport don’t automatically face a choice between body scans or pat-downs, as they do at many airports in the United States. They are subjected to profiling. All of them.
For the vast majority of travelers, even Arab and Muslim ones, that means a handful of questions. It’s a way to protect the people without humiliating them. Why not try it here?
Editorial, Pages 20 on 11/26/2010