Obama is in trouble

LITTLE ROCK — Most Democrats think Barack Obama is a shoo-in for reelection.

That overconfidence might end up making him a one-term president instead.

Yes, Obama has a number of significant advantages, including incumbency (incumbents have lost only three times since 1932), a weak challenger who musters little enthusiasm among his party’s rank and file, and a sycophantic media that is apparently ready to go even deeper in the tank for him this time around than four years ago. Analyses of the Electoral College map also suggest that he is closer at this point to the requisite 270 than is Mitt Romney.

But all that still might not be enough, for several reasons.

First of these involves a closer look at Obama’s approval ratings, which for about the past six months or so have shown roughly equal approval and disapproval, at around 48 percent. Not particularly good, but not all that bad for Obama, either (and a modest improvement compared to late last year).

Looking further, however, reveals that perhaps the most important indicator of re-election prospects—the gap between those who “strongly approve” and “strongly disapprove”—is, in his case, dangerously negative. According to a recent Rasmussen poll, only about half of those who “approve” of Obama’s performance “strongly” approve, while the overwhelming majority of the “disapprove” group falls into the “strongly disapprove” category (a whopping 41 percent of respondents overall).

This gap in intensity of approvaldisapproval suggests that there are large numbers of voters out there who currently give only modest support to Obama and who can therefore be swayed toward Romney. The vast majority of those who currently disapprove of Obama are, on the other hand, unlikely to vote for him no matter what happens.

The size and intensity of the disapproval group suggests that Obama has already lost a good chunk of the electorate.

The gap between those who adamantly oppose and firmly support fairly closely corresponds to the broader gap among self-identified conservatives and liberals within the electorate as a whole. As Obama has veered sharply to the left and become more openly partisan in his appeals, the election has already taken on a more ideological tone likely to produce a coalescing of support and opposition along ideological lines.

The problem with such coalescence for Obama is that there are roughly twice as many self-identified conservatives as self-identified liberals out there. Liberal politicians seeking the presidency must, consequently, always practice the delicate art of ideological ambiguity to be successful (as Obama did in 2008).

By running a more overtly ideological campaign, Obama violates this sacred principle of American politics, such that the more he veers to the left to energize his base the more he risks pushing independents (most of whom are temperamentally conservative) toward his opponent.

The same basic truth applies this year as in all others—you cannot win the presidency in a decidedly centerright country like America running as an unabashed liberal. If Obama attempts to do so, as it appears he will, he will almost certainly lose.

The last thing he should want at this point is for more Americans to grasp how liberal he truly is.

The final source of trouble comes in the undecided vote, which currently hovers at around 10 to 15 percent and is likely to remain there, per the historical pattern, up to within a week or two of the election itself.

The most relevant fact regarding this group is that those voters almost always tilt overwhelmingly in the end for the devil they don’t know (Romney) over the devil they do (Obama).

Taking into account this collection of factors—the size and intensity of the disapproval camp, the two-to-one edge for conservatives over liberals in the electorate (and the implications of such a gap in what promises to be a highly ideological campaign), and the historically pro-challenger behavior of undecided voters—and Dick Morris’ conclusion that if the election were held today Romney would win in a “landslide” sounds less extreme.

The idea that the Electoral College might still save Obama is undermined by the unlikelihood that there would be a great discrepancy between popular and electoral results. The electoral tally can differ (as in 2000) from the popular vote, but really only if the discrepancy in the latter is extremely small, something in the range of 1 to 2 percent (again, as in 2000).

If Romney wins the popular vote by more than this, that gap is likely to shift almost every state that isn’t overwhelmingly “blue” to his camp, along with their attendant electoral votes and the election itself.

Bottom line: Obama is in a much weaker position than his supporters realize, perhaps as vulnerable at this juncture as each of the three previous incumbents who failed to win a second term (Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Bush the first).

One of the disadvantages of living in a comforting media cocoon is that you come to mistake your enthusiasms for the enthusiasms of the nation at large. Hard-core Democrats may adore Obama, but the vast majority of likely voters most definitely do not.

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Freelance columnist Bradley R. Gitz, who lives and teaches in Batesville, received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Illinois.