Donald Trump recently selected a new National Security Adviser, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, to fill the void left by the resignation of his predecessor, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn. McMaster is portrayed as a self-confident officer who does not hesitate to speak his mind, a trait which seems curious given Trump's sensitivity and aversion to criticism. Journalists have viewed his selection positively, characterizing him as a potential stabilizing force.
These views also reflect a flawed interpretation of the general's background.
McMaster is often depicted as either a brilliant military officer or the epitome of a scholar-general. Besides serving two different tours in Iraq, McMaster also published a best-selling book, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that led to Vietnam. The general offers a caustic analysis of the nation's civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. McMaster argues that the Johnson administration's political concerns, as well as the generals who refused to speak their minds, led to the U.S. defeat.
McMaster's focus on the administration and Joint Chiefs of Staff also ignores a crucial element: Vietnamese nationalism and its emphasis on resistance to foreign domination.
McMaster also seems to imply that the United States should have unleashed a more aggressive and sustained bombing of Hanoi and North Vietnam, and immediate instead of "graduated escalation." While President Johnson may have lied and manipulated the public to pursue an aggressive and irrational war, at least he realized that expanding the war into North Vietnam could lead to a larger conflict with China. Thus, Johnson wanted to avoid one of the "lessons" of the Korean War: fighting a land war in Asia.
McMaster does not seem to give the possibility of Chinese intervention much credence. Overall, it is doubtful that the U.S. could or would have won even if the generals had implemented a more aggressive strategy or confronted their civilian superiors.
Journalists have also looked favorably upon McMaster's and Gen. David Petraeus' approach to combating Iraqi insurgents, which emphasized winning hearts and minds instead of kicking down doors and using other heavy-handed tactics. Unfortunately, these counterinsurgency initiatives as launched did not result in creating lasting stability. Indeed, McMaster will have to continue dealing with a country he invaded twice, and one in which political stability has proven elusive and ephemeral.
Commentators also failed to notice something even more troubling: The hearts and minds strategy pursued by McMaster and Petraeus has been associated with the same types of human-rights abuses that often accompany counterinsurgency efforts, including torture.
As the Iraqi insurgency continued, the commitment toward protecting civilians and respecting their rights waned. Eventually, the U.S. military resorted to the same tactics it had used earlier, including midnight raids and targeted assassinations of insurgents. Moreover, McMaster, much like Petraeus, is part of a troubling phenomenon noted recently by Andrew Bacevich: a generation of generals who have failed to win the wars they prosecuted while receiving adulation and praise.
One can only hope that the new National Security Adviser will heed his own writings, offer inconvenient truths, clear advice, and avoid plunging the U.S., and its victims, into a new round of endless and useless wars, including in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
He will have his hands full--not only dealing with Trump, but his inner circle, including Stephen Bannon.
------------v------------
Brian D'Haeseleer, Ph.D, teaches history at Lyon College in Batesville.
Editorial on 03/03/2017