WASHINGTON — The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday decided that an Arkansas defendant can be retried on murder charges even though a Little Rock jury stated that during its lower-court deliberations it had decided he was innocent of those charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Blueford v. Arkansas, the high court affirmed 6-3 the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Alex Martin Blueford, 30, who was accused of killing Matthew McFadden Jr., the 20-month-old son of Blueford’s girlfriend.
In Blueford’s original criminal trial, the jury foreman reported to Special Circuit Judge Lance Hanshaw that jurors had unanimously decided that Blueford was innocent of capital murder and murder charges but were deadlocked on the lesser charge of manslaughter. Hanshaw sent the jury back for further deliberations, but when it remained deadlocked, he ultimately declared a mistrial.
Subsequently, Blueford’s attorneys argued that a second attempt to try him on murder charges ran afoul of the double-jeopardy clause in the U.S. Constitution.
The clause, which is part of the Fifth Amendment, says that no person shall “be subject to the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
Chief Justice John Roberts said the foreman’s report to Hanshaw wasn’t a true notguilty verdict, meaning it wouldn’t be double jeopardy for Blueford to be retried.
“The fact that deliberations continued after the report deprives the report of the finality necessary to constitute an acquittal,” Roberts wrote for the majority.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who was joined in the minority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan, disagreed.
In allowing for a second trial, the decision “grants what the Constitution withholds: the proverbial ‘second bite at the apple,’” Sotomayor wrote in her dissent.
Blueford, who is currently in jail, was accused in the toddler’s 2007 death. The child had suffered a head injury while in Blueford’s care at Blueford’s Little Rock home. Matthew died a few days later at a hospital.
During his 2009 trial, Hanshaw instructed jurors to start their deliberations on the most serious charge — capital murder — but if they unanimously believed that he was innocent of that charge, to consider in descending order lesser charges of murder in the first degree, manslaughter and negligent homicide.
During deliberations, the jury became deadlocked and returned to the courtroom. Responding to questions from Hanshaw, the jury foreman stated that jurors had voted unanimously against guilty verdicts on the capital murder and murder charges, and were at a 9-3 impasse on the manslaughter charge.
“And negligent homicide?” Hanshaw asked.
“We did not vote on that, sir,” the foreman responded. “We couldn’t get past the manslaughter. Were we supposed to go past that? I thought we were supposed to go one at a time.”
The jurors then resumed deliberating. When they emerged a half-hour later, the foreman stated that they were unable to reach a verdict, and Hanshaw declared a mistrial.
In the U.S. high court decision, Roberts wrote that when the foreman re-emerged after the deliberations, she did not indicate whether the vote was still 9-3 against manslaughter or whether the jury had reconsidered the more serious murder charges.
In other words, the tally taken before final deliberations didn’t necessarily stick because one juror might have reconsidered.
“A single juror’s change of mind is all it takes to require the jury to reconsider a greater offense,” Roberts wrote.
He wrote that the jury was not given the option of rendering a nonunanimous verdict.
“As permitted under Arkansas law, the jury’s options in this case were limited to two: Either convict on one of the offenses, or acquit on all,” Roberts wrote. “The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to add another option — that of acquitting on some offenses, but not others.”
Sotomayor disagreed, writing that the jury wasn’t free to reconsider its murder and capital-murder decisions when it resumed deliberations.
“The jury heard instructions and argument that it was required to unanimously acquit on capital and first-degree murder before it could reach manslaughter,” she wrote. “And as the forewoman’s colloquy makes plain, the jury followed those instructions scrupulously. There is no reason to believe that the jury’s vote was anything other than a verdict in substance.”
Sotomayor continued: “Arkansas’ model instruction requires acquittal as a prerequisite to consideration of a lesser offense, and the Double Jeopardy Clause entitles an acquittal to finality.”
Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel, who had argued the state’s case before the U.S. high court, declined to comment about the decision. It was McDaniel’s first highcourt argument.
“We are grateful to the Court for accepting our arguments and ruling in favor of the state of Arkansas,” said his spokesman, Aaron Sadler.
In his February oral argument, McDaniel said that the foreman’s announcement was only a “snapshot” of the jury’s deliberations and lacked certainty or finality.
George Thomas III, a Rutgers University law professor who co-wrote a friend-of-thecourt brief on behalf of Blueford, said Hanshaw erred by asking the jury for its verdict on each of the charges.
Thomas said Thursday that it is possible that the decision will have an effect on future cases in how it treats the question of finality of a jury’s verdict. However, he said, he studied thousands of doublejeopardy cases and had never come across one with such a unique set of facts.
“It’s a pretty narrow case,” he said.
Front Section, Pages 1 on 05/25/2012